We consider the problem of secret key establishment (SKE) in the presence of a passive adversary, Eve, when Alice and Bob are connected by a pair of independent discrete memoryless broadcast channels in opposite directions. We refer to this setup as 2DMBC. We define the secret-key capacity in this setup and provide a lower bound on the capacity by proposing a two-round SKE protocol. We also prove an upper bound and show that the two bounds coincide in the case of degraded 2DMBCs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret Key Establishment (SKE) is a fundamental problem in cryptography: Alice and Bob want to share a secret key in the presence of an adversary, Eve. We assume Eve is passive, i.e., she can only eavesdrop the communication between Alice and Bob. Information-theoretic solutions to this problem assume that resources like channels and sources are available to the parties. We refer to a specific collection of available resources to parties as a setup.
One way of establishing a secure key between Alice and Bob is Alice choosing a random key and sending it securely as a message to Bob, i.e., using a secure message transmission protocol for SKE. In his pioneering work, Wyner [11] studied secure message transmission in a setup where there is a Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) from Alice to Bob, and a second DMC, called the wiretap channel, from Bob to Eve, through which Eve can observe a noisy version of what Bob receives from Alice. He defined the secrecy capacity in this setup as the highest rate of secure and reliable message transmission (in bits per channel use) and proved a singleletter characterization of this capacity. Csiszár and Körner [4] generalized this work, by considering the Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channel (DMBC) setup, which has one sender (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Eve). As noted earlier, the results in these setups can be applied to SKE.
Extensions of [4] , [11] for SKE have investigated setups with new types of resources. Maurer [8] and independently Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] studied the SKE problem when Alice and Bob have some correlated randomness and are connected via a public discussion channel that is noiseless, insecure, and unlimitedly free to use in both directions. The correlated randomness can be obtained via a DMBC from Alice to Bob and Eve. The use of a public discussion channel along with the DMBC makes SKE possible even in cases where the secrecy capacity of the DMBC is zero. The work in [1] and [8] also considered the case where the correlated randomness is obtained via a Discrete Memoryless Multiple Source (DMMS), available to the parties. SKE with a DMMS and a one-way limited-rate public channel was studied in [5] . The wiretap channel setup with a secure output feedback channel was introduced in [2] . The work in [7] considered noisy feedback over modulo-additive broadcast channels. SKE using a DMBC from Alice to Bob and (Eve) and a DMMS between the three parties was considered in [6] and [10] .
In practice, in many scenarios including communication between wireless peers, special resources such as free public discussion channels or correlated sources of randomness may not exist and, to establish a secure key, it may not be the best strategy to realize them from the available resources.
A. Our work
We consider a new setup for SKE where Alice and Bob are connected by a pair of independent DMBCs in opposite directions. We refer to this setup as 2DMBC. This setup is a realistic scenario in wireless networks where two nodes communicate over wireless channels in two directions, and their communication is eavesdropped by neighbors in their communication range. The 2DMBC setup allows interactive communication through DMBCs without any other resources available to the parties. We define SKE in the 2DMBC setup as a multi-round protocol between Alice and Bob with the aim of establishing a secure and reliable key. In analogy to the secrecy capacity [11] , we define the secret-key capacity in this setup, 2 , as the maximum achievable secret-key rate, in bits per channel use. We have the following results.
1) Lower bound:
We give a lower bound on the secretkey capacity. We propose a two-round SKE protocol that uses a two-level channel coding construction, and prove that it achieves the lower bound. Our lower bound can also be derived by using the SKE protocols in the DMMS-and-DMBC setup [6] , [10] . However, while the SKE protocols proposed in [6] , [10] are combinations of different constructions for different cases (depending on the setup's specification), our proposed SKE protocol uses a concrete construction that achieves the lower bound for all cases.
2) Upper bound: We prove an upper bound on the secretkey capacity 2 . The bound holds for any SKE protocol with an arbitrary number of communication rounds.
3) Degraded 2DMBCs:
We study the 2DMBC setup when the broadcast channels are degraded. We show that, in this case, the lower and the upper bounds coincide and the secretkey capacity can be achieved by a one round SKE protocol.
B. Notation
Calligraphic letters ( ) denote finite alphabet sets; random variables (RVs) from these sets and their realizations are denoted by the corresponding letter in uppercase ( ) and lowercase ( ), respectively. = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ denotes a sequence of RVs (or an -sequence) from . ↔ ↔ denotes a Markov chain between the RVs , , and in this order. We use '||' to show the concatenation of sequences. For a value , we use [ ] + to show max{0, }.
C. Paper organization
Section II gives the setup and definitions. We prove the lower and the upper bounds on the secret-key capacity in this setup in Sections III and IV, respectively. The degraded 2DMBC setup is studied in Section V. Section VI gives the concluding remarks.
II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider the scenario in Fig. 1 . Alice, Bob and Eve are connected by a 2DMBC that consists of two independent Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channels (DMBCs): a forward DMBC from Alice to Bob (and Eve), → ( , ), specified by | , and a backward DMBC from Bob to Alice (and Eve), → ( , ), specified by | . We assume that each party has free access to an independent source of randomness. Fig. 1 . The 2DMBC setup A (multi-round) SKE protocol over a 2DMBC is described as follows. In each communication round, either Alice or Bob sends a sequence of random variables (RVs) as the DMBC input. The legitimate receiver (in this round) computes a sequence of RVs to be sent in the next communication round. This sequence may depend on all previously communicated (sent and/or received) sequences of RVs. At the end of the last communication round, each party (including Eve) will have a set of communicated sequences, which form their "view" of the protocol. Let the RVs , , and be the views of Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. Using their views, either Alice or Bob computes a random variable as the secret key, while the other one computes an estimate of the key,ˆ. In a secure SKE protocol, the established key is required to be random, reliable and secret. Definition 1: For ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ≤ 1, the SKE protocol Π in the 2DMBC setup is ( , )-secure if it results in the key and its estimateˆsuch that
where and are the number of times that the forward and the backward channels are used, respectively.
When tends to zero, indicates the achievable secretkey rate, i.e., the ratio of the key entropy to the total number of channel uses. We define the secret-key capacity as follows.
Definition 2: The secret-key capacity of a 2DMBC, 2 , is the largest ≥ 0 such that, for any arbitrarily small > 0, there exists an ( , )-secure SKE protocol. The notion of secret-key capacity, following from Definitions 1 and 2, is analogous to the secrecy capacity defined in [11] and later in [1] , [4] , [6] , [8] , [10] , where the secrecy requirement in (1c) is "weak" since it requires Eve's uncertainty rate to be negligible. A "stronger" variation of (1c) requirs Eve's total uncertainty about the key to be negligible. Maurer and Wolf [9] showed that strengthening the condition (1c) above does not decrease the secrecy capacity of setups given in [4] , [8] , [11] . A similar proof can be used to show that the secrecy-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup remains the same, regardless of which secrecy requirement is used.
III. SECRET-KEY CAPACITY: LOWER BOUND Let the RVs , , 1, , 2, , 1, , 2, be independent random variables from arbitrary sets, satisfying the following Markov chains
Theorem 1: Using the above variables and letting
the secret-key capacity in 2DMBC is lower bounded as 
= m a x , , , , , 2, , 1,
Proof: In the following, we propose a two-round SKE protocol, using a two-level coding construction, that achieves (5) when Alice initiates the protocol. By symmetry, one can show that (6) is achievable when Bob initiates the protocol.
We interpret (5) as follows. 1 (resp.
[ 2 ] + ) shows the amount of secure correlated information provided in the first (resp. second) round of the SKE protocol with (resp. ) channel uses: the first round provides correlated information and the second round is used to increase correlated information (if possible) and to send sufficient redundancy so that a secure and reliable key can be extracted from the correlated information. The constraint condition in (5) indicates that Alice's uncertainty about the common randomness in the first round cannot exceed the capability for reliable transmission over the backward DMBC in the second round.
For simplicity, we use , 1 , and 2 to refer to , 1, , and 2, , respectively. Let denote the expression to be maximized on the right hand side of (5) and rephrase the constraint condition in (5) as
for an arbitrarily small constant > 0 to be determined from . Let = + and , > 0 be small constants such
We first define the following quantities to be used in the sequel.
Although the quantities obtained in (8) 
=1 be a partition of ℱ ×ℬ into parts of size 2 . Define : ℱ × ℬ → {1, 2, . . . , 2 } as the key derivation function that, for any input in , outputs the key . (vii) Define the codebook 2 as a the collection of 2 2 codewords { 2, 2 , 2 : 2 = 1, 2, . . . , 2 ,2 , 2 = 1, 2, . . . , 2 ,2 }, where each codeword 2, 2 , 2 of length is generated i.i.d. according to the distribution
: × ℬ → 1 be an encoding function such that ( , ) = 1, 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , using the above codebooks, where ( 2 , 1 ) = ( ) and ( 2 , 1 ) = ( ). (x) Let be a DMC, representing 1 → , that is specified by | 1 .
Encoding. Alice selects an i.i.d. -sequence w.r.t. and sends it over the forward DMBC. Bob and Eve receive and , respectively. Bob finds a sequence ∈ that is -jointly typical with (w.r.t. , ); otherwise, he returns a NULL. He computes = ( ) and then selects an independent uniformly random ∈ ℬ. Bob calculates ( 2 , 1 ) = ( ) and ( 2 , 1 ) = ( ), and use them to calculate 1 = ( , ). Next, he inputs 1 to to compute , and sends over the backward DMBC. Alice and Eve receive and , respectively.
Decoding. Alice finds a "unique" codewordˆ1 ∈ 1 that is -jointly typical to (w.r.t.
1,
); otherwise, she returns a NULL. Assuming no NULL is returned, she obtains (ˆ,ˆ) such that (ˆ,ˆ) =ˆ1 , and then finds a "unique" codewordˆ∈ˆ, that is -jointly typical to (w.r.t. , ); otherwise, she returns a NULL.
Key Derivation. Bob computes = ( ) and = ( , ); Alice computesˆ= (ˆ) andˆ= (ˆ,ˆ). Fig. 2 shows the relationship between the random variables used in the above protocol. Two variables/sequences are connected by an edge if (i) they correspond to the input and/or outputs of the same DMBC, or (ii) one is computed from the other by Alice or Bob, using a (possibly randomized) function. 
Randomness Analysis: Proving (1a)
We show that ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 } has enough entropy to satisfy (1a). First we discuss the RVs , , and . is chosen to be -jointly typical with (w.r.t. , ). From AEP, for each ∈ , there are at most 2 ( ( | )+ ) sequences in that are -jointly typical with ; each appearing with probability at most 2 − ( ( )− ) , and so letting
where the upper bound on ( ) is due to | | = 2 (from (i)). Since = ( ) (from the key derivation phase) and is a bijective function (from (ii)), we have ( ) = ( ). Further, is selected uniformly at random from ℬ of size (from (v) and the encoding phase), and so ( ) = .
From (vi) and the key derivation phase, there are 2 choices for the key . For every ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 }, the probability that = equals to the probability that ( , ) ∈ , i.e., (using (12) and (13))
Reliability Analysis: Proving (1b)
We shall show that, with probability arbitrarily close to 1, no NULL is returned andˆequals . In the encoding phase, using joint-AEP for and , with high probability, there exists a ∈ that is -jointly typical with (w.r.t. , ); hence no NULL is returned. The decoding phase includes two levels. The first level decodes toˆ1 ∈ 1 (which givesˆandˆ). There are 2 + codewords in the codebook 1 . From (10) and (11), we have
From joint-AEP, with high probability there exists a unique sequenceˆ1 that is -jointly typical to . The second level of decoding focuses onˆ, as a codebook and looks for a unique codewordˆ∈ˆ, that is -jointly typical to . From (i) and (iii), there are 2 − codewords in this codebook, and we have 
Equality (a) follows from (9) and (10), equality (b) is due to the Markov chain ↔ ↔ , and inequality (c) follows from (8) . From joint-AEP, the corerctˆ∈ˆ, is found with high probability. The rest is key derivation which is deterministic and does not increase the error probability, i.e., the error probability at the end of the protocol is upper bounded by that of the encoding and the decoding phase. This gives Pr(ˆ∕ = ) < for an arbitrarily small .
Secrecy Analysis: Proving (1c)
Lemma 1 gives a lower bound on ( | , ). Lemma 2 shows that this lower bound is arbitrarily close to ( ). Due to lack of space, we omit the proofs of these two lemmas and refer the reader to Lemmas 1 and 2 in [3] .
Lemma 1: Eve's uncertainty about the secret , satisfies
Lemma 2: For sufficiently large and , ( , | , 2 , 2 , , ) is arbitrarily small. From Lemmas 1 and 2, for any arbitrarily small > 0, for sufficiently large and , (1c) holds.
IV. SECRET-KEY CAPACITY: UPPER BOUND
Let the RVs , , and , , correspond to the 2DMBC setup specified by Proof: There are eight cases for a -round SKE protocol, depending on the party who initiates the protocol, the one who calculates , and whether is odd or even. We assume is even, Alice is the initiator, and Bob calculates . The other cases can be argued similarly and lead to the same result. Alice sends , : of length , in odd rounds ∈ {1, 3, . . . , − 1}; Bob and Eve receive , : and , : , respectively. Bob sends , : of length , in even rounds ∈ {2, 4, . . . , }; Alice and Eve receive , : and , : , respectively. Note that the forward and the backward channels are assumed to be used and times, respectively, and so = ∑ ∈{1,3,..., −1} , , and = ∑ ∈{2,4,..., } , .
We denote views of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of round , by : , : , and : , respectively. : is written as
]) ||
]) .
Similar expressions can be written for : and : . Fig. 3 illustrates the relationships between the sequences of RVs (and the keys), where two sequences are connected by an edge if (i) they correspond to the input and/or outputs of the same DMBC, or (ii) one is computed from the other, by Alice or Bob using a (possibly randomized) function. Letting be even, at the end of round − 1, Bob computes the sequence , : using his view, : −1 , by applying a and , : are determined from , : from the backward channel probability distribution which is independent of the views in round − 1. Accordingly,
forms a Markov chain, from which we derive the following four Markov chains, specifically used in the sequel,
By symmetry, one can show Markov chains between variables when is odd. The views of the parties at the end of the protocol are = : , = : , and = : . Bob computes the key ∈ as a function of : and Alice computesˆ∈ as a function of : . Note that, for an arbitrarily small > 0, the rate is achievable if (1) is satisfied. Using Fano's inequality for (1b), we have
Furthermore, (1c) gives 
Repeating the steps in (22) and (23) /2 times, we arrive at
where the last inequality holds since the channel is memoryless. We choose the RVs = :,˜, = :,˜, = :,˜, = :,ˇ, = :,ˇ, and = :,ˇs uch that (˜,˜) and (ˇ,ˇ) are chosen to satisfy
respectively. It is easy to see that , , and , , correspond to the 2DMBC distributions ( , | and , | ). We continue (24) as
Using (1a), (21) and (25), we have the following upper bound on
where the last inequality follows from the fact that is arbitrarily small. This proves the upper bound in (17).
V. SECRET-KEY CAPACITY: DEGRADED 2DMBCS
If the 2DMBC is degraded, the lower and the upper bounds coincide and the secret-key capacity is achieved by a oneround SKE protocol. First we give a definition for a degraded 2DMBC. , such that the former channel is obversely degraded and the latter channel is reversely degraded, implying the Markov chain
Note that Definition 4 also covers cases where the DMBC is either obversely or reversely degraded. In these cases, in fact only one of the subchannels exists, and the other one can be defined over empty sets of input and outputs. Inequality (a) follows from choosing = 0, 2, = 0, and 1, = , . Since the argument to be maximized on the right hand of inequality (a) is independent of , we remove from the expression. Inequality (b) is obtained by choosing sufficiently larger than and letting , have a constant value. Equality (c) holds since , , and hence , and , , are independent of , . Similarly, one can show that ≥ max
(28)
Combining (26)-(28) proves the theorem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 2DMBC setup matches the real-life communication between peers, esp., wireless environments where messages in both directions can be intercepted by neighbors. We defined the secret-key capacity in this setup and provided lower and upper bounds on this capacity. We showed that the two bounds coincide in the case of degraded 2DMBCs. The 2DMBC communication model corresponds to the half-duplex communication. It is interesting to study how the results can be extended to cover the full-duplex communication environment.
